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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VETERANS' BENEFThS AS A
VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
Action for a declaratory judgment to declare unconstitutional
a statute exempting veterans from fees for hunting and fishing
licenses. Held: The statute violates the equal protection clauses
of the Indiana and Federal Constitutions. Hanley v. State, - Ind.
123 N. E. 2d 452 (1954).
-,

Generally, there are three different types of benefits offered
veterans: restoration of pre-war status, by such provisions as
re-employment rights and renewal of professional licenses, e. g.

N. Y.

GENERAL BusiNEss LAW

§ 405 (6); Civil Service employ-

ment and promotional benefits, e. g. N. Y. CONST., Art 5, § 6, N. Y.

Civm SEvicE LAw § 21; exemptions from license fees and from
other taxes, e. g. N. Y. G NERAL BusiNEss LAw § 32. Each of these

general types has been attacked from the constitutional standpoint. The first two commonly have been upheld, with only a few
exceptions. The constitutionality of license renewals was upheld
in Motley v. State Barber Examiners, 228 N. C. 337, 45 S. E. 2d
550 (1947). Civil Service benefits were sustained in Matter of
Wortman, 22 Abb. N. Cas. 137 (N. Y. 1888) and Potts v. Kaplan,
264 N. Y. 110, 190 N. E. 201 (1934); but compare Commonwealth
v. O'Neill, 368 Pa. 369, 83 A. 2d 382 (1951). The third class of
benefits has been the subject of considerable litigation, with varying results.
Several different types of tax exemptions have been statutorily granted, including poll taxes, upheld in Davis v. Teague,
220 Ala. 309, 125 So. 51 (1929), property taxes, upheld in State
v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199, 212 Pac. 771 (1923), and peddling and
occupation license taxes. The latter are frequently attacked, and
in the majority of jurisdictions have been declared unconstitutional. Marallis v. Chicago,349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394 (1932). The
precise problem has never reached the U. S. Supreme Court, since
the only case to reach that Court was reversed on other grounds.
Ratta v. Healy, 1 F. Supp. 669 (D. N. H.), aff'd 67 F. 2d 554 (1st
Cir. 1933), rev'd 292 U. S. 263 (1934). Among the jurisdictions
which have upheld these exemptions are North Carolina, Georgia,
Maine, and Ohio. On the other hand, Vermont, Iowa, Wisconsin,
South Carolina, and Massachusetts have been among the majority
which have struck down these tax exemptions. See note, 83 A. L.
R. 1233. The usual grounds for the majority reasoning is that
veterans do not have a sufficient connection to the subject matter
of the tax to constitute a reasonable classification. Marallis v.
Chicago, supra.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Although the instant Indiana case involves a tax which has
not previously been brought to issue, the court treats it identically with other license taxes. The court bases its analysis
on the purpose of the statute, which is the preservation of wild
life, which is accomplished with the funds obtained from those
licenses. The court asserts that exempting veterans will deplete
the funds available for this purpose, and thereby defeat the purpose of the legislature in passing this license fee.
If this reasoning were to be adopted universally, it would seem
that almost all of the veteran benefits will fall. With the exception of the statutes attempting to restore pre-war status, no statute will be furthered by granting exceptions or exemptions. This
would be especially apparent with regulatory taxes, but will also
apply to other taxes with equal force. Although the Indiana court
mentioned that a large number of licenses are obtained by veterans, they do not require that the impairment of the statutory
purpose be great, but only that the exception "tend to produce
this result." This decision would seem to sound the death knell
for veterans benefits in Indiana, as perhaps in other states as well.
Raymond S. Ettlinger

CRIMINAL LAW -OBSCENE

TELEPHONE CALL

HELD COMMON LAW CRIME
Defendant was convicted of telephoning a married woman on
a four-party line, and using lewd and salacious language in soliciting her to commit sodomy and adultery with him. Held: Although the act violated no statutory provision, the common law
is still in effect in Pennsylvania and is broad enough to punish
acts which injuriously affect public morality. A dissent argued
that the judiciary had arrogated legislative functions to itself.
Commonwealth v. Mochan,__ Pa. Super. -, 110 A. 2d 788 (1955).
The decision cites cases in which killing a horse, Respublica
v. Teisher, 1 Dall. 335 (U. S. 1788), showing a lewd picture in a
private home, Commonwealth v. Sharpless,2 S. & R. 91 (Pa. 1830),
and even mildly vilifying the Christian religion, Updegraph v.
Commonwealth, 11 S. &R. 394 (Pa. 1824), were held to constitute
indictable offenses at common law.
New York abolished all common law crimes in 1881, PENAL
CODE § 2, L. 1881, c. 676, now PENAL LAw § 22, and all crimes must
now be statutory offenses. People v. Beintner, 168 N. Y. Supp.
945 (Sup. Ct. 1918); People v. Knapp, 206 N. Y. 373 (1912). But
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